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Review of Modernization of National Defense Program

Coping With Emergencies
*41050091 Tokyo GUNJI KENKYU in Japanese
May 89 pp 24-33—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY*

[Article by military commentator, Saito Goro]

[Text] I. Introduction

Outcries have been steadily increasing to seek a reassessment of the "National Defense Program Outline" (adopted by the National Defense Council on 29 October 1976 and approved by the cabinet on the same day), which delineates the level of defense power Japan should possess in peacetime and sets forth guidelines on the defense buildup Japan should maintain, but the government has continued its position of ignoring protests, probably because of its concern for dignity—to change a set policy would hurt its prestige—irrespective of the merits of the case.

However, on this occasion, an internal situation has arisen that cannot be disregarded. In other words, our country's present defense buildup is proceeding in accordance with the Mid-Term Defense Buildup Program (abbreviated Mid-Term Program), which covers the period from FY86 to the plan's final year, FY90, and according to the government's explanation, the defense force level established by the National Defense Program Outline should be attained by the end of FY90, the Mid-Term's concluding year.

If that is so, it is a foregone logical conclusion that the outcome of the buildup after the attainment of the goals so delineated (defense force level set by the National Defense Program Outline) will become a problem.

Theoretically speaking, the new objectives (the level to which the defense force should be built up) will probably be limited to the following three choices:

(1) Follow the present "Outline." However, adjustments will be made to correct deficiencies or faults in defense capability.

(2) Generally follow the "Outline" but increase or decrease, within reasonable limits, the number of main units, quantity of armament, etc., to enable responses to technological advancements, anticipated changes in the strategic situation, etc.

(3) Revise the "Outline" concept fundamentally. As a result, the defense force level based on it will change greatly.

Incidentally, at the "Security Council meeting" held on 22 December 1988, the decision was made to establish the next defense buildup program for the period after 1991 and planning has begun with the Defense Agency as the nucleus.

According to news reports, the next defense program (post-Mid-Term Defense Program) will be formulated as a government plan, as heretofore, and cover an interim period of 3 to 5 years. Therefore, the plan must be completed around the end of 1990, the year before the final year of the Mid-Term Program which is 1991. Thus, unless the government's guideline (one of the aforementioned three choices) pertaining to the defense buildup, which will serve as the basis for establishing the next program, is specified early, those in charge of formulating plans will probably be confused as to the course to take.

We are now confronting a period of changing times from the "Showa" to the "Heisei" era

Even with respect to "defense buildup," which is an important pillar of national security, this writer believes that there should be a significant change in concept and for that reason, I have drafted this article to spur the government toward decisionmaking and appeal the urgency of the case to the readers.

II. "National Defense Program Outline"—Product of Political Considerations

To understand the characteristics of the "National Defense Program Outline," it is probably necessary to survey the course of developments at the time of its birth.

Japan's postwar defense buildup got under way with the First Defense Buildup Plan (abbreviated First Defense Plan, 1958-60), when augmentation began with the backbone forces of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. During the Second Defense Plan (1962-66) and Third Defense Plan (1967-71), the defense buildup aimed at countering "aggression on a scale up to localized war with conventional weapons" was advanced, and the Fourth Defense Plan (1972-76) pursued the same objective (however, with the reversion of administrative rights over Okinawa, the element of defense for that region was newly added).

Up until then, the defense buildup can be said to have somehow progressed satisfactorily. This is confirmed by the following statistics:

Percentage of defense-related expenditures in general account budget: 1955—13.61; 1960—9.99; 1965—8.24 (Note: Recent percentage of defense-related expenses in general account budget is approximately 6 percent).

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Ratio of defense-related expenditures to GNP (percent): 1955—1.78; 1960—1.23; 1965—1.07 (Note: The ratio of defense-related expenses to GNP at that time exceeded 1 percent).

However, in 1970, the percentage of defense-related expenditures in the general account budget plummeted to 7.16 percent and likewise, the ratio to GNP dropped to 0.79 percent. This happened probably because pressures from the mass media and opposition parties heightened and the government became hesitant about increasing the defense budget.

Furthermore, from about 1972 when the Fourth Defense Plan started, domestic and foreign situations began to move in a direction that obstructed the smooth progress of the defense buildup.

First, with respect to the world situation, the mood to relax tensions (detente) generally deepened with the signing of the first U.S.-Soviet SALT (Strategic Arms Limitations Talks) Treaty in May 1972, the conclusion of peace with Vietnam in January 1973, etc. Taking advantage of the prevailing mood, our country's mass media and opposition parties began to exert pressure on the government to negotiate defense efforts.

Also, at about this time, with the oil shock as the turning point, our country's economy changed from one of high-growth to one of stability, there was a retrenchment in the national budget and, in particular, the atmosphere became one in which criticism of defense expenditures would deepen.

Moreover, in the domestic political situation at the time, the emergence of reformist forces became noticeable and in both the lower and upper houses, the situation became one where conservative and progressive forces were evenly matched and before long, apprehensive feelings began to spread generally that the conservative government might be overturned and a reformist coalition regime would be established.

Under these circumstances, it was not strange that those who specially felt a sense of crisis happened to be Defense Agency authorities, particularly the internal bureau officials. In any event, their fears were understandable because if some unknown political party, which waved the banner of "unarmed neutrality," and which did not recognize either the Self-Defense Forces or the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty, were to head the reformist coalition government, there was no telling what it might propose. Thereupon, defense officials put their heads together and the "defense buildup" concept they proposed, as one which even a coalition reformist regime would accept, was the "peacetime defense" or the so-called "basic defense concept." This "basic defense concept" became the foundation upon which the "National Defense Program Outline" was established.

The "basic defense concept" consisted of the following points (parenthetical notes are this writer's views):

(1) Within the general neighborhood of Japan, the equilibrium of power among the superpowers will probably continue and a peaceful state will be maintained. Therefore, a full-scale military aggression against Japan is not conceivable in the near future.

(Note: Before then, there were already signs of a break in the detente. Soon after, in late 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan began and the U.S.-Soviet honeymoon period ended. Wasn't the assessment of the world situation by Japan's defense authorities too optimistic?)

(2) It is the right of a sovereign nation to possess a defense force even in peacetime but the significance of peacetime defense lies in expressing determination to preserve our country's independence and peace and in deterring aggressive intentions against our country.

(Note: The basic purpose of a military buildup is to prepare for emergencies. Thus, the so-called "peacetime defense power" is nothing more than an abstract, meaningless concept. Also, isn't it self-complacency to think that "determination" and "peacetime defense power, i.e., small-scale defense force" can deter the enemy's aggressive intentions?)

(3) The posture of peacetime defense must be one that can exert the most effective defense capabilities in given situations, such as by maintaining the basic functions and organizations needed for our country's defense (surveillance and warning, countermeasures against direct and indirect aggressions, command communications, rear support services, etc.), securing alert, effective defense power through deployment (5 mobile operation units, 12 divisions and 2 composite brigades in the ground forces; 4 escort flotillas and 10 regional divisions in the maritime forces; and 28 control and warning groups and 10 interceptor squadrons in the air forces, etc.), promoting modernization of equipment, strengthening rear services support, etc.

(Note: This section shows that Japan's defense structure, such as "maintaining basic functions and organization" or "securing alert, effective defense power through deployment," was decided upon arbitrarily without regard for the enemy's attack capability. In other words, it is a unique and strange theory called "the doctrine to deter and repel threats" and is the biggest problematic point in the "buildup outline.")

(4) Such a defense buildup program must be one which can be reasonably implemented within constitutional and policy restraints, and furthermore, executed with expenditures confined to within 1 percent of the GNP and even under circumstances where personnel recruitment and facilities acquisition are expected to be difficult.

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(Note: Here, too, the difficulties of "personnel recruitment," "facilities acquisition," etc., rather than the necessity of defense buildup, come to the fore and the cold feet of defense officials are exposed. Also, the estimated limit of expenditures to "within 1 percent of GNP" resulted from the easygoing thinking that because the FY73 defense-related budget did not exceed 0.85 percent of the GNP and the economic growth was continuing at approximately the nominal rate of 16 to 17 percent and the real rate of 10 percent, a considerable buildup of defense power would be possible within 1 percent of the GNP but soon, this became a factor in creating a powerful brake on the defense buildup.)

Since it is a defense buildup program based on the above concepts, it is natural that it should be extremely restrained and generally, it assured only the level of defense to be achieved upon completion of the Fourth Defense Plan.

I do not mind acknowledging the efforts of the internal bureau officials, including the then Defense Bureau Chief Takuya Kubo (deceased) for striving tirelessly in the face of the great opposition to defense raised by our country's mass media and opposition parties, which were carried away by the world's detente mood at the time the "National Defense Program Outline" was formulated, to gain recognition for the urgency of defense endeavors to, at least, maintain the existing defense level and plan for improvements, but I cannot close my eyes to the fatal error committed of giving too much priority to political considerations and neglecting the true course of "defense buildup," the first principle of which should be the pursuit of military rationality.

Concessions are a part of politics. However, this writer would like to state, at first, that at the root of his

proposals is his belief that important matters such as the "military armament plan" (National Defense Program Outline), which is an important pillar of national security, should not be diverted from the true course and should be rectified immediately.

III. Reasons for Seeking Reassessment

1. Changes in International Situation

In the first article (objectives and intent) of the "National Defense Program Outline," it is stated that the "defense capability our country should possess" is based on the "premise" that "there would be no drastic changes for some time to come in the world situation for the stability of which continuous efforts have been made, in the international political structure of the region adjacent to Japan, and in the domestic conditions." Therefore, isn't it reasonable to assume that when there are changes in domestic or external conditions, particularly in the world situation, the line of thinking and the defense force level indicated in the appendices should be reevaluated?

Well, a close scrutiny of the international environment surrounding Japan reveals that there are a number of significant changes or indications of changes and some of the important ones are given below.

The first item that should be noted is the trend toward augmentation and increase in military activities of Soviet forces in the Northeast Pacific region (i.e., the Far East region).

The following statistics (refer to Table 1) confirm the extent of augmentation:

Table 1. Transitions in Strength of Soviet Far East Forces (1988 edition of Defense White Paper)

Classification	When National Defense Program Outline Was Formulated (1976)	Present (1987)
Intermediate-range nuclear forces	SS-20 0; TU-22M Backfire 0	SS-20 apprx. 162; TU-22M Backfire Appx. 85
Ground forces	31 divisions apprx. 300,000	43 divisions apprx. 390,000 troops firepower and mobility upgraded through introduction of T-72 tank armored infantry combat vehicles, etc.
Naval forces	apprx. 755 vessels; apprx. 1.25 million tons	apprx. 840 vessels; apprx. 190 million tons reinforced through deployment of new vessels, including Kiev-class aircraft carriers, Kirov-class nuclear-powered guided missile cruisers, Kara-class guided missile cruisers, Sovremenny-class guided missile destroyers, etc.
Air forces	Combat aircraft apprx. 2,030	Combat aircraft apprx. 2,430 replaced by new types of high-performance aircraft, including TU-22M Backfire bombers and MiG-23/27 Flogger, SU-24 Fencer, MiG-31 Foxhound and SU-27 Flanker fighters.

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It should also be noted that, in addition, the following Soviet capability estimates were made by the Defense Agency (1988 edition of defense white paper).

"The (Soviet) Ground Forces...have made qualitative improvements and efforts are being made to improve not only firepower, maneuverability, protective power and battlefield air defense capability, but chemical warfare capability.

"The (Soviet-Pacific Fleet has not only deployed the Ivan Rogov-class amphibious assault ships and Ropucha-class landing ships but possesses a naval infantry division, the only one of its kind in the Soviet Navy, and making efforts to upgrade the amphibious assault capability, including modernization of the equipment. In addition, reinforcements have been made in merchant ships which can be converted to military uses, such as the LASH vessel (vessel carrying lighters on board) and the RO/RO [Roll on/Roll off] vessel (vessel designed to carry containers and cargoes loaded on transport equipment, such as trucks and trailers, and equipped with a handling system for loading and unloading of such transport equipment with cargoes at a pier).

"The (Soviet) Air Force is, at present...making replacements with high-performance aircraft at a noticeable pace and approximately 80 percent of the fighters are...third-generation aircraft...and fourth-generation aircraft, and continuing to modernize through deployment of the fourth-generation aircraft. As a result of the addition of these new aircraft, the Soviet Air Force in the Far East has greatly improved, as compared with before, anti-land and anti-ship attack capabilities as well as the capability to secure air superiority.

I am appalled at the poor sense of crisis management on the part of our government leaders, who are still expressing easygoing views that "there are no causes which necessitate a reassessment of the Outline," despite such a conspicuous Soviet display of intensified augmentation (in the case of the Far East Navy, there was an increase of 750,000 tons during the last 10 years; in view of the fact that the present strength of our Maritime Self-Defense Force is 260,000 to 270,000 tons, the abnormality of such an increase is noticeable).

Next, the change in expectations by the U.S. Government and Congress toward Japan's defense augmentation is undoubtedly an important factor to consider when planning Japan's defense buildup (in the sense that it is a proposal of a friendly ally).

The United States is now troubled by increases of the "twin deficits" in budget and trade and movements have begun to revise the military expansionary policy, which had been an important pillar of the Reagan regime, and to cut military expenditures. On the other hand, voices

are being raised to strengthen demands for "burden-sharing" (sharing defense responsibilities) among allied countries in the "collective security" system. It seems that that view is expressed in this year's "U.S. Defense Report (18 January)."

Of course, the United States is seeking from Japan not only direct defense augmentation but desiring burden-sharing in a broad sense, including stable uses of U.S. bases in Japan, external economic assistance on a global basis, etc., but judging by the recent Tower testimonies (at the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee hearings on 25 and 26 January, Tower testified that "Japan can further increase the ratio of defense expenditures to GNP within the constitutional framework"), it appears that there are still a considerable number of personages with U.S. Congressional affiliations who belong to the camp which formerly denounced "Japan as the habitual offender of getting a free ride on the Security Treaty," and if such persons ever assume the position of defense secretary, it can be imagined that defense demands against Japan will become even stronger. For Japan, this should not be interpreted as "foreign pressure" and the thinking must be changed to one based on a broad perspective that Japan's self-efforts to upgrade its defense force level will not only serve to nurture U.S. confidence in Japan but it is the means to contribute positively to the world strategy of our allied country, United States.

Moreover, the situation in Northeast Asia is extremely fluid, with signs appearing of a Sino-Soviet reconciliation, with the strengthening of the military alliance between USSR and DPRK, and with whispers starting about U.S. troop withdrawal from ROK, etc., and conditions are changing involving many factors which might affect Japan's future.

Thus, from whatever aspect viewed, conditions in areas adjacent to Japan are showing changes which are significant enough to warrant a revision of the "Outline." This fact should be recognized frankly by the government and defense officials. I believe that revising the contents of the program on the basis of the latest situation assessment is an appropriate step since that would be following the most practical procedure for program readjustments and it is an indispensable step to put Japan's defense policy, particularly its important pillar of "defense buildup," on the right track.

IV. Reasons for Seeking Reassessment

2. Doubts about Posture of "Outline"

The military armament plan of a nation must be formulated on the basis of how it can cope with anticipated military threats and preserve the national sovereignty. However, the "National Defense Program Outline" intentionally estimates that "threat" to be at an extremely low level and furthermore, tries to confine it to small-scale aggressions, like sudden attacks by the

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enemy in peacetime. That can be discerned by examining the "Basic Policy of National Defense Program Outline" (1978 edition of "Defense White Paper"), as in the following items:

"....b. Countermeasures for Aggressions

"In general, when discussing threat, distinction is made between intent of aggression and capability for aggression.... In the Outline, 'intent' is viewed as being constantly changeable and difficult to detect but when considering the significance of its influence or effect on international politics, the changeability of 'intent' is regarded as a factor which cannot be altered freely but is inherently limited and the bigger the scale of the planned aggression, the stronger will the restraining element function.

"On the basis of that judgment, the Outline states that it will not determine Japan's defense scale with concern solely for the aggression 'capability' but will aim for a defense force that will possess a balanced posture in terms of organization and deployment and is capable of a full surveillance posture in peacetime and as for the types of aggressions to be countered—of the aggressions up to localized warfare with conventional weapons, which had been the past objective—it aims to effectively counter aggressions which are limited not only to area but to objectives, means and duration, and of a small scale.

"These small-scale aggressions are defined as aggressions which, in general, are difficult to detect, e.g., conducted as surprise attacks without large-scale preparations, and aims at creating a de facto situation within a short period of time and the Outline tries to prepare from peacetime for such aggressions.

"This writer has many doubts about the foregoing explanation but will comment on two points that he considers important."

(1) What is the meaning of the statement, "not to determine our defense force scale with concern only for the 'capability' aspect of the 'threat' (of the imaginary enemy)?" It can be interpreted to mean that our "defense force" will be determined without regard for the threat level of our enemies (invasion forces, etc.) but can we feel secure in our country's defense under such circumstances? To estimate the enemy's planned invasion point, strength, means, etc. and to prepare an adequate force to destroy such an invading army would seem to be the proper course.

(2) It seems that this program was focused on the creation of a "peacetime" defense force.

That can be discerned from statements, such as "the so-called peacetime defense force framework...will be pursued from the viewpoint of maintaining a full surveillance posture in peacetime and...the Outline is preparing from peacetime for such aggressions."

"However, isn't the 'defense buildup' strictly committed to the preparation for emergencies? A 'defense force' which is useless in an emergency is like a scarecrow. Needless to say, drafters of the 'Outline' anticipated that such criticisms would arise and provided the following excuses (Basic Concept of Defense Program Outline" (1978 edition of "Defense White Paper").

"...c. Transition to New Defense Posture

"While passing the aforementioned judgments, the Outline considers the fact that future developments in the international situation always 'harbor uncertain elements and no one can ascertain the future with certainty so if, in particular, the true posture of defense is to prepare for an emergency, this unknown factor cannot be ignored. In other words, in the event great changes occur in the world situation and the aforementioned 'premise' collapses, the defense power must be expanded and strengthened accordingly and for this reason, the Outline states that it is prepared for such situations and has built-in mechanisms which enable it to change to new defense postures.

"Well, is there a potentiality to change to such new defense postures?"

In present-day Japan, there is no system to mobilize troops rapidly in an emergency and as for armament, the stored reserve is minimal, and there is no setup for emergency acquirement. Nor can it be imagined that numerous facilities and bases can be acquired in emergencies for defense purposes.

For these reasons, it is evident that no preparations whatsoever have been made for "change to new defense postures" in emergencies. The postulations in this "Outline" are merely "castles in the air."

"Above are my views regarding the 'Basic Concept of the National Defense Program Outline,' and they support what I stated earlier in this article that, 'the Outline has a big defect in that political considerations took precedence and military rationality was neglected,' and since the product of such political concessions is not a feasible standard to regulate the nation's vital 'defense buildup,' I believe it should be reevaluated at an early date."

I also want to add the following comments:

In the "Defense Posture" section of the "National Defense Program Outline," the following statement appears:

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"...2. Countering aggressions...when direct aggressions occur...limited and small-scale aggression will be repelled in principle, without outside help but in the event repulsion without external assistance is difficult because of the scale, type, etc. of aggression, Japan will continue strong resistance by every possible means until cooperation from the United States is gained to repulse the enemy."

As a basic concept to defend one's country, this line of thinking is truly unworthy of Japan, a sovereign nation that is the world's second-ranking economic superpower. To strengthen the bonds of U.S.-Japan alliance is important and depending on the time and circumstances, it might be necessary to obtain U.S. support. However, that should mean the seeking of support for troops and materiel that are still deficient after mobilizing all available resources of Japan and the thinking is of a different order from the undisguised "reliance on others" postulated in the "Outline." I also want to raise this point as a valid reason to obtain reassessment of the "Outline."

V. Conclusion

I have had misgivings from before about the nature and contents of the "National Defense Program Outline." However, I have been hesitant to cry for its reassessment because of the reason given below.

The reason is that I have been aware of the poor state of Japan's defense force and disparity between it and the troop strength in the "Outline" so I believed that, above all, the priority was to reach the level mentioned in the "Outline."

However, through the attainment of 5 to 6 percent increases in defense expenditures in successive years, Japan's defense buildup is beginning to take shape as far as frontal troop strength, frontal armament, etc., are concerned. That is probably why the government and the Defense Agency are announcing that the defense force level stipulated in the "Program Outline" can be achieved during 1990, the final year of the current Mid-Term Program.

I hope that the government and the Defense Agency will make further efforts to bring to fruition Japan's defense buildup, which has somehow begun to take shape, and I also earnestly wish that they will step up endeavors to gain the consensus of the populace to promote defense measures.

On this occasion, the authorities should reveal concretely the true state of Japan's defense force to the people, indicate how the present Self-Defense Forces can defend the people against what types of aggression under what circumstances and disclose clearly the deficient aspects (both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of defense power).

At the same time, it is obvious that the point which cannot be evaded is the disclosure of the nature of military threat against Japan (it is clear that the greatest threat is the Soviet Far East Forces).

In order to obtain the people's consensus, it seems apparent that the circuitous, obscure arguments presented in the previous "Program Outline" should be avoided and a commonsense military buildup doctrine which is premised on "countering crises" and advocates "self-help efforts" is desirable.

Above are the reasons why this writer selected this occasion to propose a "reassessment of the Outline."

It must be noted, as stated at the beginning of this article, that the task to formulate the defense policy for the next period has already begun. Basically, before the start of operations for the next defense program, new "guidelines" (new defense program outline) should have been formulated but it is regrettable that, as in the past, the government is hesitant and refraining from showing aggressive actions. I hope for the government's bold decision, without fail, regarding this matter but as a temporary measure, I ask that planning be done for some expansion of the defense force scale (adjustments of the Outline's appendices) and the internal argumentation of the defense force, such as the upgrading of the sustainability for continued warfare, improvements in troop accommodations, etc., be started.

I do not wish to see our beloved country, Japan, become a deformed nation with enlargement only of the economic sphere and retarded growth in other areas.

I believe that to maintain a country's dignity, together with morals, etiquette, culture, etc., or more so, a military defense buildup befitting a sovereign nation, is an indispensable element.

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[Article by military commentator, Toshiharu Takenaka]

[Text] Approaching the final year for the procurement of 1974 model tanks, the modernization of equipment, the modernization of Honshu Divisions, and the upgrading of steady fighting capability are to be carried out!

Upgrading of education and training

This year is Heisei 1, which is the end of one era and in a sense the beginning of another, and I wonder how this year's Ground Self-Defense Forces program is doing.

The program is generally classified into five categories as usual, such as the upgrading and modernization of fighting capability, the improvement of readiness, the

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upgrading of education and training, and the improvement of living and work environments. It is true that this is nothing new, but for the fighting group, these five categories are the only way to describe the program.

There have been slightly new changes in the specifics of each program every year. Especially in the upgrading of education and training, considerable improvement has been seen, though it would be better to say that this upgrading was returned to previous levels.

As for education and training, of special note are: the northern special maneuver by one division in the Chubu [Central] District Force, which is mobilized at Hokkaido; the long-range shooting training by the Honshu technical arm unit, which will move to Hokkaido; the firepower battles and the live ammo battle training in subject designated practices instead of saving ammunition for training and education; and so on.

Chemical material for training will return to previous levels, and the number of times these supplies are used for companies' and for battle corps' training will increase from three to four. The number of times fuel supplies are used for companies' education and training will increase from four to five.

One personnel measure concerns making samples of regular uniforms. I hope the uniforms will look neat and handsome. A German proverb says that "fine cloths make the man," but a uniform has a more significant meaning than that.

Accordingly, if the training is upgraded and uniforms are neat, morale will improve.

Modernization of Honshu Divisions

At last, the modernization of the Honshu divisions will begin. In Heisei 1, the modernization pertains to the 4th, 6th, 8th, and 9th Divisions in the Seibu [Western] and Tohoku [Northwestern] District Forces.

The modernization is in accordance with that of the Hokkaido divisions.

For the general arm regiments, about 10 large trucks are to be added to their equipment, and motorization for securing transportation is to be achieved. I hope that this will lead to organizing into one regiment equipped with wheeled and armored vehicles.

The 6th Battalion in the technical arm regiments, which has been in charge of antiaircraft for the division, will become an independent antiaircraft battalion, and its crown number will be the same as that of the division.

The arms, supply, transportation, and sanitation units, which have been in charge of rear positions, will be integrated, and a rear support regiment will be newly formed.

Because of the importance of the Seikan [Aomori-Hakkoda] district, the 9th Division's modernization will differ from that of other divisions. It is estimated that the 9th Tank Battalion, which up to now has consisted of three companies and three platoons and been equipped with 45 tanks, will be strengthened to consist of three companies and four platoons with 57 tanks or so.

For the other three divisions, antitank units will be increased. Specifically, an antitank platoon will be equipped with eight sets of the 1987 model antitank guided missiles (medium MAT's) in the antitank unit. For the time being, one platoon with medium MAT's will be set up with them. The formation of completed antitank units will consist of 2 platoons with 16 sets of 1987 medium MAT's and two platoons with 16 sets of 1979 model heavy MAT's.

The 7th Division, which achieved modernization in 1987, will also be strengthened. This is part of a project for tanks moved to northern units, the selecting of one tank company from each Honshu division, and by this, strengthening the three tank regiments in the 7th Division. The details are not known, but one speculation is that a tank regiment is to be formed, increasing the number of tank companies from the present 4 to 5, while maintaining the total number of 18 tanks for a tank company, which will consist of 4 tank platoons equipped with 4-wheel tanks. Then, the number of tanks equipped for tank regiments will exceed 90, and this means that tank regiments will have tank capability approximating that of Soviet army tank regiments.

Modernization of equipment

Major projects regarding equipment required for the strengthening, quality improvement and modernization of sea/shoreline blasting capability are shown in the table below. This equipment will be acquired in about 2 to 3 years.

	Until 1988	Until 1989
Project	Project	Project
1987 model medium MAT's	46	24
1979 heavy MAT's	129	28
1988 model surface to ship missiles [SSM-1]	6	16
FH70 howitzers	230	43
203mm self-propelled howitzers	79	6
1974 model tanks	817	56
1973 model armored vehicles	229	23
1982 model command communication vehicles	119	24
1987 model scouting/warning vehicles	31	16
1987 model side gun ammunition vehicles	15	8
Armored battle vehicles	0	8
1981 model short SAM's	53	4
1987 model self-propelled antiaircraft machine guns	12	8
AHIS antitank helicopters	56	9

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In the Hokkaido divisions, 1987 medium MAT's will replace the 106mm recoilless guns which were supplied to recoilless gun platoons in general arm companies; while on the other hand, in the Honshu divisions these will be supplied to medium MAT platoons, which will be newly formed in the antitank units. At first, the Hokkaido division will be given priority. And 1979 model heavy MAT's will replace the 106mm recoilless guns with which antitank units have been equipped.

The antitank equipment has nearly been systematized, and the only thing to be done is the modernization of portable antitank rockets for self-defense. I think that this will appear in Heisei 3 or so. If so, the front position to about the 3,000 meter line in the enemy direction can be intensively covered. Then, Japan's Self-Defense Forces can possess an antitank capability equivalent to foreign countries.

With regards to the 1988 model surface to warship missile (SSM-1), six units were for the first time procured for education purposes in 1988, and they will be acquired by the end of next [fiscal] year. This year's 16 SSM-1's are for real war deployment for the first time, and they are to be supplied to one unit of the Hokubu [Northern] District Force. It is not decided yet whether this real war unit is to be directly supervised by the northern units or come under the 1st Technical Arm Corps. Since these weapons involve a very complex weapons system and are for super-long range, it is the superintendent generals of the district forces that decide to launch them, so I am guessing that the possibility for direct supervision under the district forces is greater.

FH70 155mm howitzers will be supplied to the technical arm regiments in the Honshu divisions. As for the remaining 105mm howitzers, it is possible to anticipate that someday the technical arm regiments in the Honshu division will be standardized with approximately 210 FH70's. With these, the technical arm's firepower will be strengthened several fold, but there is some worry that there is a lack of swift firepower. At the same time, a problem will occur with the replacement and modernization of 107mm trench mortars, which up to now have been supplied to heavy trench mortar companies in general arm regiments. It is certain that these will be replaced by 120mm trench mortars, and the selection of type is in the final stages.

Technical arm groups directly supervised by district forces are equipped with 203mm self-propelled howitzers, and so far most Hokkaido technical arm groups have been equipped with this standardized type. There remain 48 self-propelled howitzers with four battalions of the 2d Technical Arm Group of Sendai and the 3d Technical Arm Group of Yufuin, and replacement and modernization of them can be expected. The equipment complementing these are the 1987 model side gun ammunition vehicles, procurement of which started in fiscal 1987 but lagged behind. The ideal procurement is

for one 203mm self-propelled howitzer and one 1987 model side gun ammunition vehicle, so efforts to speed up this procurement are needed.

Some 56 1974 model tanks will be procured in this their final year for procurement, and from next year the long awaited 1990 model tanks will replace them. With this procurement, 1974 model tanks will total approximately 880, about 300 short of the fixed number for tank equipment, with 1961 model tanks remaining to fill this gap. Anyway, I would like express my appreciation for the efforts and enthusiasm of those who have been so assiduous in the production of them for 15 years.

The 1973 model armored vehicles also took a long time to procure. The general arm regiments and tank battalions were equipped with them, and until the armored battle vehicles mentioned later become fully introduced, they will play a transitional role for armorizing one general arm regiment of each of the Hokkaido divisions. When armored battle vehicles are provided and these 1973 model armored vehicles are given to the facility battalions and the rear support regiments, those concerned will certainly be glad.

Procurement is smooth for 1982 model command communication vehicles, which the technical arm regiments and scouting units of the divisions will be equipped with, and for 1987 model scouting/warning vehicles, which will become major equipment for the scouting units. This proves that it is easier to increase the number of wheeled vehicles, which are cheaper than tracked vehicles. With this lesson learned, the development of wheeled armored vehicles for the Honshu divisions has become very desirable.

Eight armored battle vehicles are to be procured for the first time, and they are to be used for education purposes. These will allow four general arm regiments to be equipped with MICV's. For this, 250 vehicles will be necessary, so that the midterm defense buildup plan, which is a 5-year plan, will be repeated twice. At any rate, I am concerned that Hokkaido's fighting capability cannot be calculated if it is built up with scanty equipment, like the 1973 model armored vehicles.

The 1981 model short SAM's [surface-to-air missile] have at last been distributed to all divisions, so that from now on efforts will be made to reserve the missiles themselves. Eight 1987 self-propelled antiaircraft machine guns will be supplied to the 7th Antiaircraft Technical Arm Regiment along with last year's procurement of eight guns. In recent years, the 6th battalions of the technical arm regiments have become independent antiaircraft technical arm battalions one after another, so importance should be attached to the speedy procurement of 1987 model self-propelled antiaircraft machine guns, which provide the major fighting capability for

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these battalions. Since these guns are certainly expensive, procurement of them is limited to around eight per year, and I wonder when they will be procured for the Honshu divisions or whether or not they will be procured at all.

Eight out of nine AHIS helicopters procured this year will make up the new 4th Antitank Helicopter Unit. This follows the 1st Antitank Helicopter Unit of Obihiro, the 2d of Hachinohe, and the 3d of Medatebara, though its location is said to be undecided.

Not shown in the table are the upgrading of the improved Hawk (Type II) for one antiaircraft technical group, 44 sets of stinger portable SAM's, five CH47-J transport helicopters, three chemical protection vehicles, and 1,803 new rifles.

Chemical protection vehicles are in the family of 1982 model command communication vehicles, and are responsible for swift chemical scouting. They will be supplied to the chemical protection platoons of units being newly formed, which are to be attached to the division commands.

The worldwide trend for small caliber rifles has spread to Japan at last, and the procurement of rifles using 5.56mm x 45 bullets will begin from this year. This year, they are primarily procured as an educational requirement, but from next year they will be procured for real war purposes, i.e. procured, in order, for airborne troops and for general arm regiments equipped with armored battle vehicles. Regarding whether or not all troops will have replacements and modernization and be equipped with the new rifles, I think that it is urgent to replace the 1964 model rifles, which have become notorious. Also, I hear that the research on squad firearms in accordance with this is in progress. It is not spectacular but proximity general firepower is the backbone of fighting capability, and from the standpoint of the muzzle and bayonet of the rifle as security, I think that the modernization of these should be given priority above anything else.

Problematic Practice Sites

As mentioned above, equipment for war and victory in the modern surface battle is being introduced, and now is the time to seriously think about the problem of practice sites.

How should we consider a situation in which the actual test launching of an SSM-1—which is our best bet for a frontal response and early explode initiative—cannot be conducted domestically, despite the SSM-1 being made purely in Japan?

It is a sophisticated system which is launched from a specular surface, moves over the sea surface while checking the terrain, and flies by active radar homing, so that it will be useless in real war conditions unless actual

test launchings are repeated to the point of becoming boring. Some question whether or not inertia guidance can be really and accurately done for ICBM's [intercontinental ballistic missile] when they cross the Arctic Circle, the conditions for which are very complicated, even though a number of actual test launchings of ICBM's have been conducted. It would be better to be able to conduct tests in hypothetical war zones if possible, but of course any launching at the Sea of Okhotsk is impossible.

However, unless a lot of launching is done at domestic ranges, and immediate feedback of the data obtained there for repeated improvement is done, there is no chance that this missile can become a real weapon. If it is not actually used after deploying in preparation for a real war, it may not strike even if it is supposed to strike—and I am worried about the possibility of such a miserable result.

The problem of this actual test launching site may become a bottleneck for the development of small bullet spray type guns and rockets, which have become the general trend around the world. Small bullets are sprayed irregularly to some extent and are subject to wind affects. I wonder what the results of firing seaward would be, but ground testing is necessary in order to accurately understand the impacts of these, and it is no exaggeration to say that there is no suitable site for firing toward the sea.

The main issue, and a more urgent problem to face, are practice sites for the troops.

There are six large practice sites, with more than 4,000 square meters, and they were supposed to be used on the district force level. However, in actuality, they are small even for division level practice; and for a fully combined arms practice, the site is overcrowded for even confrontation practice by regiment battle corps. Moreover, under the jurisdiction of the Chubu District Force, there is not this large a practice site.

Practice and training using a number of real bullets are the best method to improve skills, but there are too many restrictions. Excessive safety control is also a problem, but practice sites are too small at any rate. The only practice site which allows about a 30 km range is the Zenbetsu Practice Site in Hokkaido (3,000 square meters), and Japan's largest, the Yausubetu Practice Site (170 million square meters), cannot be used for firing tank guns due to its plain landscape. Even if long range FH70 howitzers or 203mm self-propelled howitzers are introduced, in reality, training in long-range fire is unfortunately impossible.

In addition, the road administration, without order and completely lacking any sense of security, is allowing encroachments upon practice sites one after another. Good examples are the Fuji Tozan Do [Fuji Mountain-Climbing Road] at the Fuji Practice Site and the Do'ou Jidousha Do [Hokkaido Central Highway].

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The practice sites are part of national lands which do not require any acquisition cost, so that they are the first to be targeted, and are taken by coaxing, such as saying that just a part of the edge will be used for roads. Certainly a road can be constructed at the edge of a practice site and it is possible to have sufficient range when a field battery is set up. However, in reality, car drivers are bound to see the practice while driving, accidents will arise from the surprise of loud firing noises, etc. For all these reasons the position of the field battery is pushed further inside the practice site, and consequently the range becomes shorter and shorter.

Moreover, firing across these roads is out of question. With great effort the Higashi Fuji Practice Site and the Kita Fuji Practice Site were made adjacent to each other, permitting a more than 15 km range, but they were separated by the Fuji Tozan Do (Fuji Mountain-Climbing Road) and the range has shortened by more than half.

Aside from the this firing site problem, there are defects in the landscape of the practice sites. Current practice sites are most likely spread out at the foot of a mountain. When you think about it, the fighting of a war to defend Japan would not take place upon such a landscape. Even if the sites cover hypothetical situations in practice, there are limitations on us.

Moreover, since the frontal response and early explode initiative are recently so talked about, practice sites including beeches must be necessary. Because most strategic points have become urbanized areas, a place to practice city battles has also become necessary. Something must be wrong if there is a plan for an initiative, but there isn't even a glimpse of a shadow in reality.

If these kind of practice sites are not available, there is no other way but to practice in so-called civilian areas. You may say that such a thing must be impossible, but I have heard that until the Showa 1930's or so, this was frequently done.

I have heard another story as well. Some Self-Defense Force members were taking practice shots using blank cartridges on the embankment of the Edo River while on their way to the Narashino Training Center from Nerima. While they were shooting, an official of the ward office ran up to them. These Self-Defense Force members thought that they might be in trouble, but the official presented them with a bottle of sake, given by the head of the ward in appreciation of their efforts.

Even today not everybody is hostile to the Self-Defense Force. The problem is that SDF members think that people see them as an enemy and become daunted by this kind of perception.

However, I cannot force an SDF official, who has a wife and children, to risk his position through acts of bravado. So, the idea of seeking practice sites outside Japan

becomes important. For example, how about Canada, which NATO allies are jointly using? If this were possible, SDF officials could see serious NATO troops at first hand and this would be good stimulation for them.

Among this year's projects, the intensive improvement of practice sites and the safety of impact areas are specially noted. These are very important measures, but since we cannot overcome our destiny of living in a small land, changes in thinking are necessary.

Review of Reserve SDF Officials

The most important support factors for continuous fighting capability are the reserve of ammunition and the quality and quantity of the reserve SDF officials who supplement the battle. Out of a request to increase the number of reserve SDF officials by 3,000 this year, an increase of 1,000 was approved. This brought the total of reserve Ground Self-Defense Force officials to 47,000.

GSDF [Ground Self-Defense Force] seemingly intends to eventually increase the number of reserve officials to that of active officials. Yet, in order to achieve this, retired SDF officials alone are not enough, and there has been talk that the direct appointment of civilians is under consideration. Although this is fine as far as it goes, I think now is the time to review the reserve SDF officials.

How viable will fighting capability be, if we just recruit people who have never used a pistol, layman who are thinking that working in the disciplined atmosphere is good once in a while? It is better than nothing, but it would be a troublesome task for the active members who are responsible for their education.

How to utilize the reserve SDF officials in the first place—I think, around this point things are not clear. The system itself is going to be different, whether SDF's supplement troops, which are worn out, on an individual basis or on a troop basis. Even if they say that they cannot send reserves to the front-line and they are in charge of the rear, in modern warfare there is not much difference between the front and the rear. Also, if a situation becomes difficult, they could not help but appoint reserves to the front line. If reserves were supplemented on an individual basis, this would quickly have a superficial buildup effect, but fighting capability would continue to be questioned. If supplemented on a troop basis, this could be counted as a factor in fighting capability, but this would require time, such as for preliminary training.

Either way, it would be useless to gather them at the nearest station, give them physical examinations, and give them exercises in counting "one two/one two." The Self-Defense Forces need veterans, experts for battle, as far as the reserve is concerned. It is important to assign these people in accordance with their skills, and to prevent their skills from deteriorating. This is a very

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important task for units in charge of reeducation and for the reserve SDF officials. How to resolve this will be a problem, and one method is to set up reserve SDF officials retraining centers in big cities. As a layman I think there ought to be some kind of solution, so I expect to see some serious studies by experts.

Rear Echelon Augmentation

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[Article by GUNJI KENKYU editorial staff writer Taisei Ugaki: "The First Year of the Heisei Era Will Stress Rear Area Augmentation"]

[Text] The midterm defense consolidation plan has entered its second half, and, though unpretentious, the Maritime Self-Defense Force will expand such things as mine sweepers, acoustic measuring ships and district fleet DE [destroyer escort], and will also put efforts into the rear-echelon budget!

Stressing the Rear Echelon!

The defense-related budget for the first fiscal year of the Heisei era (1989) was set on 24 January of this year at 3.9198 trillion yen, a 5.9 percent increase over the previous fiscal year. Within this, the ratio occupied by the Maritime Self-Defense Force annual expenditure budget for the fiscal year was 24.8 percent, a total of 971.6 billion yen.

This is a growth-rate of 3.3 percent over the previous fiscal year, and breaks down into personnel/food (cost of personnel and provisions): 312.0 billion yen (a growth rate of 0.4 percent), the amount converted to annual expenditure: 504.9 billion yen (a growth rate of 3.2 percent) and cost of general supplies: 154.7 billion yen (a growth rate of 9.8 percent). With this, the component ratios of the three categories of forward echelon, rear echelon and personnel/food come to 38 percent, 30 percent and 32 percent respectively, and of these the rear echelon has grown by four points compared with the previous fiscal year, so the budget for the current fiscal year became one in which this field was finally given the greatest emphasis. Furthermore, as to the amount of the burden for later fiscal years, the portion already decided on was 454.1 billion yen and the new portion is 546.8 billion yen, so the total amount became 1.9 trillion yen. Within this, forward-echelon equipment related items account for 68 percent of the whole, and rear-echelon related items are 32 percent.

The following items are included in the Maritime Self-Defense Force related items in operation plans for the current fiscal year which the Defense Agency has already announced.

Organizational items: in addition to new organization of the 47th and 48th escort flotillas accompanying such things as the commissioning of warships and aircraft, the Maritime Self-Defense Force will carry out such things as new reorganization of required units.

Increase of personnel: accompanying the organization of units and so on, Maritime Self-Defense officials will increase by 321, and its complement will be made 46,406 (an increase of 321).

Information and communications items: in order to attempt to enhance the reliability of communications at sea, the Maritime Self-Defense Force will promote improvement of transmission stations for the very low frequency (VLF) signals used by submarines and of the satellite communications function used by warships.

Unit operation items: in order to enhance the setup for an adaptable response, the Maritime Self-Defense Force will attempt to improve the setup for management and use of torpedoes and mines.

Personnel and health items: in regard to the Maritime Self-Defense Force, the rate of sufficiency for self-defense officials will continue to be 96 percent. Therefore, it will employ approximately 3,200 male seamen and 170 female seamen.

It will devise measures to make service on the crew of a warship more attractive.

Education and training items: along with attempting to enhance the number of cruising hours per year for escort vessels, the Maritime Self-Defense Force will promote augmentation of such things as ammunition and equipment for use in education and training.

In regard to training and maneuvers, the Maritime Self-Defense Force will enhance tactical skill by Maritime Self-Defense Force maneuvers and so on, long-distance training cruises to the vicinity of South America and dispatch of warships and aircraft to America.

Equipment items: it will commission the following warships, which are currently under construction.

Three FY85 3,400-ton model destroyers; two FY86 1,900-ton destroyers, two FY87 490-ton minesweepers and two FY87 8,300-ton supply ships (a total of 9 ships and 31,580 tons).

It will newly begin construction of the following warships.

Two 1,900-ton submarines, one 2,400-ton submarine, two 1,000-ton minesweepers and one 2,800-ton acoustic measuring (SURTASS) ship of the 2,800-ton model (a total of six ships and 11,000 tons).

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It will acquire the following aircraft, which are in the process of being procured.

Ten P-3C's, 1 U-36A, 3 modified KM-2, 17 HSS-2B and 4 MH-53e (a total of 35 aircraft).

It will newly procure the following aircraft.

Ten P-3C's, 1 U-36A, 2 LC-90, 2 modified KM-2's, 12 SH-60J's, 4 MH-53E's, 3 UH-60J's and 2 OH-6D's (a total of 36 aircraft).

It will newly procure the following guided missiles.

Two sets of type 81 short-range SAM's and 24 sets of portable SAM's.

Items common to the three self-defense forces: they will expand such operational materials as ammunition, torpedoes, mines and missiles in order to attempt to enhance their capacity to carry on sustained warfare.

Facilities items: as well as improving livelihood-related facilities and so on by such things as rebuilding outworn buildings, it will augment such necessary facilities as powder magazines, management and storage facilities for torpedoes and mines, and harbor facilities accompanying new reorganization of units and commissioning of aircraft.

Research and development items: along with continuing to promote research and development on a new antisubmarine (shipborne) helicopter system from the previous fiscal year, it will begin work newly on research and development on such things as the G-RX4 short-range torpedo for antisubmarine use.

Other items: disaster-rescue and so on—it will promote augmentation of such things as aircraft and communications equipment that can be put to use when engaging in such activities as disaster rescue.

Maritime safety—it will promote all kinds of maritime safety measures, such as rescue equipment and prevention of disasters at sea.

Warships to be Built by the MSDF [Maritime Self-Defense Force] in FY89 (unit: Y1 million)

Classification	number of ships in FY88	FY89 Budget			
		number of ships	total amount	annual expenditure	later fiscal years
Destroyer (DD)	1	-	-	-	-
DDG (AEGIS [Active Electronic Gimballess Inertial System] ship)	1	-	-	-	-
D E	-	2	50,116	314	49,803
Submarine (SS)	1	1	39,058	136	38,922
Minesweeper (MSO)	-	2	32,485	383	32,102
Minesweeper (MSC)	2	-	-	-	-
Support Tanker ship (AOS)	-	1	14,286	169	14,177
Support ship	4	5	1,111	215	796
Total	9	11	136,957	1,217	135,740

Maritime Self-Defense Force Plan of Operations for the Current Fiscal Year

The Maritime Self-Defense Force's plan of operations for the current fiscal year will be devised and implemented under the foregoing general policy; with the current fiscal year's plan as the 4th year of the current midterm defense plan, the Maritime Self-Defense Force will make it its basic policy to push forward with augmentation of high-quality defense power which is balanced between forward and rear echelons, and to go on training powerful units at the same time.

Therefore, it is making such things as establishing an operational posture suitable for modernization of equipment, attempting to perfect the adaptable-response setup, the capacity to carry on sustained warfare, and survivability, and aiming at strengthening its human base the items which will be stressed in the current fiscal

year. Let us examine below the detailed content of the plan of operations for the current fiscal year, which was devised in hopes of achieving these main objectives.

Principal Warships

As stated above, the warships to be newly built which are included in the plan for operations in the current fiscal year are two 1,900-ton DE destroyers, one 2,400-ton SS submarine, two 1,000-ton MSO minesweepers and one 2,800-ton AOS acoustic measuring ship, a total of six ships; neither the 490-ton MSC minesweeper nor the new model 5,500-ton LST [landing ship tank] transport vessel that the Maritime Self-Defense Force requested in its draft plan were approved.

Among them, the 1,900-ton DE is a type which has been enhanced by bringing together the three important conditions of antisubmarine, air defense and surface striking

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power in response to global enhancement of surface warship and submarine capability; a destroyer of the same series as the FY86 DE for coastal and nearby waters. All of them are warships designed for district fleets. It was arranged for up to six to be built under the mid-term defense power consolidation plan, and with the two for the current fiscal year, it means that six will probably be assembled, so modernization of district-fleet forces will be promoted.

Furthermore, the SS is also the same type as the 2,400-ton model from FY86 onward, and is taken to be the portion to make up the complement (16 ships). However, one SS will be decommissioned at the commissioning stage in FY92, so overall strength will not go beyond 15 ships.

In contrast to this, the 1,000-ton MSO is a new project of the current fiscal year; it aims at realizing minesweeping capability that can deal with mines in deep reaches of the ocean, which was lacking in the Maritime Self-Defense Force hitherto. Consequently, if this MSO is completed it will probably mean that the Maritime Self-Defense Force's minesweeping capability in the areas outside major harbors will be enhanced greatly in terms of quality.

The last item, the AOS, is also something on which work will begin newly in the current fiscal year, following on from the ASW [antisubmarine warfare] Center of the previous fiscal year; in response to the quieting of SS [patrol submarine] and SSN (nuclear powered submarines) in recent years, it tows a higher-performance sound-detecting device (SURTASS [surface towed array surveillance system]). The SURTASS is scheduled to be purchased from the U.S. Navy as FMS [foreign military sales], but the hull will be built by the Japanese side, and later taken to America and the SURTASS loaded on board.

Originally this ship was not included in the current midterm defense plan, but as a result of discussion between Japan and America on a policy of enhancing antisubmarine capability, Japan obtained the agreement of the U.S. Government, and the beginning of construction on the first ship was incorporated in the current fiscal year. There is no doubt that the Maritime Self-Defense Force's acoustic information collection capability will be greatly enhanced by the procurement of this AOS, and for the present, construction and maintenance of two of them is scheduled for the Maritime Self-Defense Force. The budget amounts for building the above boats in the current fiscal year's plan of operations are as shown in the table.

The New Model DE Makes its Appearance!

In addition to the above warships to be newly built, nine warships will be commissioned in the current fiscal year: three 3,400-ton DD's, two 1,900-ton DE's, two 490-ton MSC's and two 8,300-ton AOE's [fast combat support ship].

Of these the DD's are the fifth to seventh of the "Asagiri" model, the building and improvement of which has been promoted since FY83. All are ships of the FY85 plan. Both the DE which follow these are ships of the FY86 plan; they are an enlarged and advanced model of the 1,290 to 1,470-ton "Ishikari". It is the newest model surface warship that will make its appearance in the current fiscal year; compared to the "Ishikari" its survivability, antisubmarine capability and air defense capability have all been strengthened.

The ship-type is one which has a level deck throughout, and the hull and superstructure is a steel construction aimed at increasing survivability. Among items related to weapons, on the side of enhancing antisubmarine capability, it will be outfitted with a new type of sonar and ASROC [antisubmarine rocket] eight-mounted launchers. Meanwhile, on the side of enhancing air defense capability, after commissioning, it is scheduled to be outfitted later with RAM [redeye air missile] missiles as a new weapon for use in individual-warship air defense. The RAM missile is a multilaunch short-range SAM system which was developed jointly by NATO centered on America and West Germany; after being launched, the missile spins like a rifle bullet as it flies, and has the capability of destroying antiship missiles which come flying over the water at very low altitudes.

It has a longer range than the CIWS [close-in weapons system] used up to now, which used the 20 millimeter Vulcan cannon; furthermore, its new departure is that it can pick up multiple targets simultaneously, and that two light missiles are fired into one target in succession; while it is smaller and lighter than the existing Sea Sparrow short-range SAM, it is said that one can anticipate higher-performance antimissile defense capability. For air-defense weapons the ship carries one of these RAM and one of the conventional CIWS for use in close-quarters defense, so it works out that the new model DE will have a twofold air defense system based completely on missiles and a machine cannon.

Furthermore, for use in striking against surface vessels, for the present it will be equipped with only one (76 millimeter single-mounted repeating cannon with a 62 aperture), but on this side, too, it is scheduled to be equipped with the Harpoon SSM, so at a later time there will be installed two of the same type of four-shot launchers as the "Ishikari" model.

The main engine is a CODOG [mixed propulsion system] type made up of an Olympus-Spey SM1A gas turbine and a Mitsubishi SI12U diesel. Its output is 27,000 horsepower, and its top speed is 27 knots.

The MSC and the AOE

The MSC, which comes next after the DD and DE, is the first appearance of a modified "Hatsushima" model, a FY87 ship. Basically it is the same as the "Hatsushima"

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models up to now, and its outside appearance is also virtually the same, but in addition to the ship's inner living facilities having been improved, it has been equipped newly with medium-depth mine-sweeping equipment, so its displacement will increase to 490 tons from the 440 tons which has been the standard up to now.

The last ones, the AOE's, will be the second and third of the same model continuing on from the "Towada", a FY84 ship. It is the largest class as a warship used for supply and support of destroyer units, and it is a type of ship for which emphasis will be placed on procurement for the present so that together with the "Sagami" FY76 AOE, it will be possible for one to be attached to each escort flotilla, for instance.

The construction of the hull is a form which follows that of the general run of tankers; the shape of the ship is one in which the stern is high. From the outside it can be said to look like an enlarged "Sagami," but inside the ship new devices will be employed everywhere for the purpose of attempting automation, with such things as a device being introduced which by means of a computer can read, minute by minute, the state of the feeding of fuel oil into the engines. Furthermore, in response to progress in the change of destroyer weapons to missiles, the winch derrick post for transporting them has been made larger, and it is expected that a stern helicopter deck will also be introduced in the near future; the space has been greatly expanded so that it will be possible for large helicopters to take off and land.

The main engines are two Mitsui 16V42M-A diesels; total output is 26,000 horsepower, and it obtains a

maximum speed of 22 knots. It is said to have a crew of 140, 10 more than the "Sagami."

The trend of major warships is as described above, and in regard to the Maritime Self-Defense Force's support ships, a total of 7 ships: one each 260-ton YT tugboat, 490-ton YO refueling ship, and 270-ton YG refueling ship and two each 270-ton YO refueling ships and 25-ton lighters were requested in the draft plan for the current fiscal year.

Of these, five have actually been budgeted for: one each of the 260-ton YT, 270-ton YO and 270-ton YG, and two 25-ton YF. The total amount is 1,011 billion yen, and the amount of annual expenditure for the current fiscal year is 215 million yen. The remaining 799 million yen is the burden for later fiscal years.

Aircraft

Another pillar of major equipment which rivals warships is aircraft, and the breakdown of the 38 aircraft which were newly requested in the draft plan for the current fiscal year was as follows:

Twelve P-3C antisubmarine patrol planes, one U-36A training support JP aircraft, two LC-90 (communication aircraft), two modified KM-2 initial flight-training aircraft, 12 SH-60J shipborne antisubmarine helicopters, four MH-53E minesweeping helicopters, three new model UH-60J rescue helicopters and two OH-6D initial flight-training helicopters.

And of these, the ones that were approved in the plan for the current fiscal year were 10 for the P-3C and the number requested for the U-36A, LC-90, modified KM-2, SH-60J, MH-53E, UH-60J and OH-6D.

Aircraft to be Purchased by the MSDF in FY89 (unit: 1 million yen)

Classification	Number of Aircraft in FY88	FY89 Budget			
		Number of Aircraft	Total Amount	Annual Expenditure	Later Fiscal Years
P-3C antisubmarine patrol plane	9	10	96,777	0	96,777
EP-3 electronic warfare data aircraft	1	-	-	-	-
U-36A training support aircraft	1	1	2,552	41	2,512
US-1A rescue seaplane	1	-	-	-	-
LC-90 (communications plane)	-	2	960	102	858
Modified KM-2 initial flight-trainer	3	2	741	47	694
SH-60J antisubmarine helicopter	12	12	57,466	273	57,193
MH-53E minesweeping helicopter	-	4	17,704	136	17,568
UH-60J rescue helicopter	-	3	9,441	0	9,441
OH-6D initial flight-training helicopter	-	2	416	0	416
Totals	27	36	186,057	597	185,460

Of these, 12 P-3C were requested in the draft plan because an average annual procurement of 10 was estimated in the mid-term defense plan, and short-shipment

of two aircraft occurred in FY 84-85. However, the 10 aircraft which were budgeted for in the current fiscal year will be allotted to the ninth P-3C flying corps, so

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with the amount for the current fiscal year, this aircraft's strength, when complete, will be 84 aircraft. This figure accounts for as much as 93 percent of the Maritime Self-Defense Force's fixed-wing antisubmarine aircraft strength.

As to the U-36A, continuing on from the previous fiscal year, it is arranged that a fifth aircraft will be acquired, and the LC-90 new-generation communications aircraft will be the portion for replacement of the natural decrease of the B-65L, which has become outmoded. The modified KM-2 are for replacement of the existing conventional KM-2, and will maintain the number required for training. It is said that when approved for unit-use in the near future, this airframe will also obtain the director-general's approval for its formal name to be the T-5.

Meanwhile, as to helicopters, it is arranged for the SH-60J shipborne antisubmarine helicopter to be allotted to a second group, so the work of procuring and preparing this helicopter is getting on track. Four of the MH-53E large minesweeping helicopters were guaranteed, and will be allotted to a second tactical unit following on from the six-helicopter portion for one tactical unit based on FY86-87. Furthermore, the UH-60J new-model rescue helicopter, which will make its appearance newly in the current fiscal year, is something to deal with the obsolescence of the S-61A, which is in the process of becoming obsolete. It has been developed from the same airframe as the SH-60J, and it is anticipated that its search and rescue functions will be greatly enhanced by such things as being equipped with infrared dark vision devices.

The OH-6D, which is last on the list, is a small helicopter for use in initial training, and will be the portion to replace natural decrease in the J model of the same helicopter. The amounts budgeted in the current fiscal year for purchase of the above aircraft are as shown in the table on the preceding page. A total of 35 aircraft are scheduled to be acquired in the current fiscal year: 10 P-3C, which are being procured, one U-36A, three modified KM-2, 17 HSS-2B and four MH-53E.

The First Securing of Guided Missiles

It has been arranged that beginning in FY89, parallel with all types of warship and aircraft, procurement of such things as short-range SAM and portable SAM for air defense of major bases will also newly begin. In the current fiscal year initial procurement of two sets of the same type-81 short-range SAM and 24 sets of the same "Stinger" portable SAM, as those of the Ground Self-Defense Force, and 6 towed Vulcan 20 millimeter cannon (VADS [Vulcan Air Defense System]) were approved, and will be acquired under a 3-year plan.

All are for the purpose of gaining local air-defense capability for operational bases, and disposition at the Hachinohe Airbase is scheduled. In addition to this, three sets of runway-repair mats for use in air-defense of Maritime Self-Defense Force air bases will continue to be maintained.

Organizational Items

In warship units, a 47th Fleet Escort Force and 48th Fleet Escort Force will be newly organized based on the commissioning of new-model warships. Of these, the 47th Fleet Escort Force will be formed of a total of three ships: the FY85 DD "Sawagiri," which will be commissioned in the current fiscal year, and the existing "Asagiri" and "Yamagiri," and will be incorporated into Sasebo's Second Escort Flotilla. And accompanying this, the "Hamayuki" will transfer from the Second Fleet Escort Flotilla to the Third Fleet Escort Flotilla.

Meanwhile, the Fourth Fleet Escort Flotilla will be composed of three ships: the FY85 DD "Hamagiri" and "Setogiri" and the existing "Sawayuki," and will be incorporated into Yokosuka's First Fleet Escort Flotilla. In addition to the above, a slight amount of reorganization of both warship units and aircraft units will be carried out accompanying the commissioning of warships and aircraft.

Moreover, the following new reorganizations will be implemented in land units too.

New establishment of a person in charge of legal matters in the Administration Section of the Yokosuka District Maritime Headquarters.

New establishment of a cost-auditing post in the Accounts Department of the Kure District Maritime Headquarters.

New establishment of a Gas Turbine Service Section in the Maizuru Building and Repair Center. With this, establishment of a gas turbine service section in every district maritime headquarters will be completed.

The third guided weapons support section after those at Yokosuka and Sasebo will be established at the Maizuru Supply Center.

A Medical Section will be newly established in the Submarine Medicine Experimental Corps.

A Foreign Procurement Section will be newly established in the Management Department of the Supply Control Corps in order to attempt to make such things as the work of FMS procurerment more efficient. This is something that will unify the work of the Maritime Staff Office, the Supply Control Corps and Yokosuka.

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Communications/Electronics Related Items

Among the items which are indispensable in terms of the Maritime Self-Defense Force's operation of its units, one can cite such things as communications/electronic warfare related items, enhancement of an adaptable response setup and cooperation between Japan and America. The following projects will be put into practice in the communications/electronic warfare related items within this.

It will continue preparation of the Ominato microwave terminal station and so on as the Maritime Self-Defense Force's share of the Defense Digital Communications Network (IDDN), for which preparation began in FY87 as a joint project of the three staffs in the communications field. As to the transmission station for very long waves for submarine use (VLF), which similarly began from FY87, the MSDF will begin work on the remaining portion of the construction of the steel tower, and the preparation of receiving devices for use in SS's. It is estimated that operation of these will commence from the end of FY90. It will promote continued augmentation of a satellite communications system for use by warships.

As to electronic-warfare related items, having to attempt to enhance electronic warfare capability, it will promote modernization of such things as radio detection devices and radio jamming devices, and will also promote preparation of a setup which is capable of collecting, analyzing and evaluating all types of data.

In regard to command and control related items, in order to maintain the SF system, for which renewal was completed in the last fiscal year, it will promote improvement of an at-sea data broadcasting system by software and connection with warships at sea. Furthermore, in the current fiscal year it will set to work newly on improvement of the District Maritime Headquarters operations system so that enhancement of the operational capability of district fleets and exchange of information with other units can be carried out in an appropriate manner. In regard to ASWOC [antisubmarine warfare operations controller], those at Atsugi and Hachinohe are already in operation, and in the current fiscal year its operation at Kanoya will also begin, and the MSDF will aim at newly augmenting the Naha transmitting station and beginning operation in the next fiscal year.

Meanwhile, in regard to enhancement of the adaptable response setup, it will attempt to improve the setup for management and use of torpedoes and mines, and such things will be implemented as promotion of mounting and preparation of an adjustment place, and improvement of the Sasebo and Ominato powder magazines. And in regard to defense cooperation between Japan and America, research and consultation in every field will also be continued in the current fiscal year.

Increasing the Complement and Personnel Policy

The Maritime Self-Defense Force will increase by 321 members, making the FY89 complement 46,406. Meanwhile, because of an increase of 17 and a reduction of the complement by 45, the FY89 complement of clerical officials and so on will be 4,057, making a combined total of 50,463.

With this the combined total will reach the 50,000 level, and it is considered that the average annual sufficiency rate of 96.0 percent will continue to be maintained in the current fiscal year too.

Meanwhile, in personnel policy the emphasis will be placed on improvement of the working and living environments. Concerning the former, [as published] it will promote preparation of specially large berths (2 meters long) for use on warships and satellite television broadcast receivers for use on vessels, and from the current fiscal year will set to work newly on augmentation of air conditioners for use in lecture halls.

And concerning the latter, improvement of public-service-worker quarters, barracks, galleys, health centers, pools and gyms will be promoted more than heretofore. In addition, it is said that commissioning of the work of dishwashing to outside entities, and improvement of clothing will also be promoted.

Education and Training Items

Included within education and training items are such things as maneuvers, practice cruises on the open sea, dispatch overseas for training, training devices and expansion of annual cruising time for destroyers. The ones among these which will be put into practice are: in maneuvers, the Maritime Self-Defense Force Maneuvres (B maneuvers in which the commander of the Self-Defense Fleet is the overall commander), in practice cruising on the open sea, the ones in the South America area by the training ship Katori and two DD's, and in dispatch overseas for training, not RIMPAC [Rim of the Pacific], but conventional training in which one is dispatched to America.

Furthermore, in training devices and the like, improvement of such things as maritime defense simulators, devices which train in distinguishing far and low signals, submarine underwater operation training devices, locations for practice in protecting against fire and water, individual training devices for the P-3C and devices for practice in the equipment systems carried by the SH-60J will be promoted.

Concerning expansion of the number of annual cruising hours for destroyers, in order to restore the training level, it was arranged to increase by one time the flotilla training of the Third Escort Flotilla, continuing on from the First and Second Escort Flotillas. Having to increase

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the annual cruising hours of destroyer groups by 240 hours over what it is at present, making it 1,570 hours, an increase of fuel will be attempted accompanying this.

Improvement of Facilities

In regard to facility-improvement at warship and air bases in all areas, the improvement of powder magazines at Ominato, Hachinohe and so on mentioned above, a supplementary wharf at Kure and such facilities related to disposition of P-3C's as aircraft hangars at Kanoya and Naha will be promoted. Moreover, a study for the purpose of establishing a helicopter base at Maizuru will begin in the current fiscal year.

In addition, as education and training facilities, a device for training in antisubmarine tactics and a device for comprehensive tactical training for the SH-60J will be introduced at Etajima and Tateyama respectively. And in livelihood-related facilities, improvement of barracks for female self-defense officials at Omura and so on, a pool at Iwojima and a recreation center at Tateyama will be promoted.

Research and Development

Among items on which research and development will begin newly from the current fiscal year, the following can be cited as the major items connected with the Maritime Self-Defense Force.

The G-RX4 short-range antisubmarine torpedo, a new-model sonar for submarines and an adjustable fragmentation shell for 76 millimeter cannons.

Other Items

In addition to the items above, improvement of rescue and survival equipment for the purpose of safe operation of warships and so on, and measures related to environmental preservation can be cited. Of these, the improvement of rescue and survival equipment is considered in the current fiscal year to be an item which should be promoted with particular haste in light of last year's accident in which the Nadashio and the civilian fishing boat First Fuji Maru collided.

In warship-related items, enough radar-wave reflection spheres (10-centimeter spheres) for 15 ships (all to be installed on submarines), enough life-line throwing appliances for 162 ships, 64 communications devices (telephones) and 30 heat-insulated submersion suits (dry suits) will be prepared. And in aircraft-related items, it has been arranged that 112 survivor slings and 201 lamps for showing the position of victims will be prepared.

Meanwhile, in regard to preservation of the environment, all sorts of measures to preserve the environment will be promoted, such as installation of sewage disposal facilities, muffling devices and so on.

The Current-Fiscal-Year Plan and the Midterm Defense Consolidation Plan

With construction of warships and procurement of aircraft based on the above budgeting, what will the strength of the current-fiscal-year's plan be when completed? The time of completion will be the end of FY92, and the strength of major equipment will probably be as follows.

To begin with, destroyers will increase by two, but it is probable that one will be decommissioned and the total number will become 61. Since the objective of the current midterm defense consolidation plan, which lasts until the second year of the Heisei era (1991) [as published], is held to be 62 destroyers, it works out to be lacking one destroyer. Of these 42 will be equipped with missiles; seven will be equipped with antiaircraft missiles, nine will be equipped with antiship missiles, and 26 will be equipped with both antiaircraft and antiship missiles.

And with an increase of one submarine, and one being decommissioned, their number will come to 15, so one will be lacking. For the large minesweepers, two will be cleared as planned, but one will be lacking on the small minesweepers. Including the Sagami, there will be three supply ships, but, as might be expected, one will remain unacquired. As to transports, one of a new model was planned in the midterm defense consolidation plan, but no action was taken on it in the current fiscal year, so one ship remains as it was. As to training ships, a successor to the Katori is being planned for, but this has not been budgeted for either, so the situation remains as it was.

Moreover, in regard to missile boats, which were considered to be one of the pending matters, procurement of three boats was scheduled after the type had been selected, but although Italy's Spalviero class was viewed as the leading contender for a time, later its budget was used for other major ships and aircraft, and so on, so for the present the plan itself has become virtually meaningless. In regard to acoustic measuring ships, one was budgeted for in the current fiscal year, so the remainder will be one ship.

But, when we add on the 19 ships that were secured in FY86 to FY88, construction of 24 ships has already been secured during the period of the mid-term defense consolidation plan up to now, including such things as one AEGIS system missile destroyer, which was a pending problem, six DE destroyers, four submarines, two minesweepers, two supply ships and one training support ship. With this, the warship units among the mainstay units: four escort flotilla antisubmarine surface warship units for mobile operation, six submarine corps submarine units and two minesweeper flotilla minesweeping units will probably all maintain their strength, lacking

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one ship each. Furthermore, it appears likely that the 10 destroyer corps surface warship units that belong to district fleets will be able to clear their complements almost completely.

The midterm defense consolidation plan is going by rapidly; the current fiscal year is the 4th year since it began, and only the next fiscal year remains. The ships that were left for this last fiscal year are one each AEGIS missile destroyer, mine sweeper, transport ship, training ship and submarine, one small minesweeper, two landingcraft and three missile boats, and also one acoustic measurement ship which is outside the plan, so the allotment of the budget for the next fiscal year will be watched.

On the other hand, at the time of completing the plan for the current fiscal year there will 194 aircraft, but it will reach neither the approximately 220 aircraft which is the target of the National Defense Program Outline, nor the 214 aircraft which is held to be the target of the midterm defense power consolidation plan. But 12 of the P-3C, which is the leading item, have been left, so if these can be secured in the next fiscal year, it will meet the midterm defense consolidation plan target of 50 aircraft. For fixed-wing antisubmarine aircraft there is the P-2J

force in addition to this, and when one combines these two, a force of approximately 90 patrol aircraft will be realized when the plan for the current fiscal year is completed, so it will probably reach the level of a lack of 10 aircraft compared to the midterm defense power consolidation plan's target of 100 aircraft.

On the last item, helicopters, due to achievement of the plan for the current fiscal year, it will leave only 12 of the SH-60J and 2 of the MH-53E. In regard to the antisubmarine helicopters among these, at the time of completing the portion for the current fiscal year, in shipborne models the 84 helicopters which is the complement for four escort flotillas [as published] will be filled, and the number of land-based helicopters will come to 46. According to the target of the midterm defense power consolidation plan, the number of land-based helicopters is held to be 56, so the portion lacking comes to 10 aircraft.

Moreover, in regard to the number of units, there will be 14 land-based antisubmarine aircraft units, so it will reach the point of having two more units to go of the 16 units which is the target of the National Defense Program Outline.

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